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F. & B. TRANSPORT V. WHITE TRUCK SALES MANITOBA LTD. (1965),
49 D.L.R. (2d) 670-CONTRACTS-RESCissIoN-1956 MODEL TRUCK
WITH 1958 CAB REPRESENTED TO BE 1958 TRUCK-PROMPT REPUDIA-
TION BY PURCHASER ON DISCOVERING MISREPRESENTATION-RIGHT
TO RESCISSION AFTER EXECUTION AND COMPLETION OF SALE-PUR-
CHASER FAILING TO GET WHAT HE BARGAINED FOR-EXONERATING
CLAUSE AS TO WARRANTIES ON "YEAR MODEL" No DEFENCF,-The
dilemma of the dissatisfied purchaser continues unresolved. How-
ever, any failure to arrive at a solution is attributable not so much
to a reluctance of the courts to recognize the existence of the prob-
lem, as to a determination to achieve results within a framework
of rules and terminology that requires modification and readjust-
ment, if not replacement.
The opportunity to deal with this problem, or at least to consider
many of the issues involved, arose in F. &, B. Transport v. White Truck
Sales Manitoba Ltd.1 a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal.
In this case the plaintiff bought from the defendant an International
diesel tractor (the truck) which was represented as a second hand,
1958 model. Extensive repairs made road testing at the time of sale
impossible, and a broken speedometer prevented any accurate estima-
tion of past mileage. A new 1958 cab, replacing the old one, had been
put on the truck making any investigation into the physical con-
dition of the truck very difficult. Also, contained in the contract,
was a clause which read:
Purchaser acknowledges that this agreement constitutes the entire
contract and that there are no representations, warranties, or con-
ditions, express or implied, statutory or otherwise, other than as con-
tained herein. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing Purchaser
agrees that there is no warranty as to the 'year model' even if stated
herein.
The plaintiff took delivery of the truck and kept it for nine
months. During this period the vehicle's unsatisfactory performance
led to further inquiries as to its age, and it was established that the
truck was in fact a 1956 model. Upon this revelation, the contract
was promptly repudiated, and the plaintiff notified the defendant
that he had rejected the truck.
At trial, Dickson J. considered the "misrepresentation was one
going to the root of the contract", 2 and held the defendant's conduct
fraudulent. He allowed the plaintiff to repudiate the contract and
reject the truck. However, on appeal, Miller C.J.M. claimed that
the fraud of the misrepresentation need not become an issue. "Even
though the misrepresentation was innocent", he was prepared to allow
the plaintiff to repudiate on the ground that "the article delivered was
not the article contracted for.' 3
No doubt the defendant's stipulation as to the year model of the
truck was an important element in the agreement, but, beyond that,
1 (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 670 (Man. C.A.).
2 (1965), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 419, at p. 422 (Man. Q.B.).
3 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 671.
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was it a representation, 4 a warranty,5 a condition,6 or, in more recent
language, a fundamental term? This rigid classification appears
necessary in our application of available remedies to particular situa-
tions, and it is for this purpose that the question is asked. However,
the confusion of the terms that arise in each attempt to delineate
these categories, and the arbitrary and unpredictable limits that are
often drawn fail to provide even that certainty which one would sus-
pect they were designed to insure.
Dickson J., in his reference to the 1956 truck received by the
plaintiff said:
The thing contracted for was substantially different from the thing
delivered. There was a complete failure of consideration. The mis-
representation was going to the root of the contract.7
In effect, one would assume he was dealing with the fundamental
obligation of the contract. And yet, this explanation does little to
clarify the issue, because that is much the same terminology that the
courts have used in defining a condition, or distinguishing a con-
dition from a warranty.8 For example, a condition has been described
as "a term which, without being the fundamental obligation imposed
by the contract, is still of such vital importance that it goes to the
root of the transaction."
9
Miller C.J.M. is even less precise in his classification of this par-
ticular fact situation, although the importance he attributes to the
year model of the truck would seem to indicate much the same con-
clusions as those expressed at trial. Thus the distinction between
such terms as a condition and a fundamental term remains confused
and unclear.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in their judgment, never refer
specifically to the idea of the breach of the fundamental obligation,
and the extent of the available remedies. Miller C.J.M. refers to "a
difference in substance between what was contracted for and what
was delivered; the plaintiff did not get what he bargained for".1 0
Nevertheless, the decision appears to follow closely the logic involved
in the concept of the fundamental obligation, which was devised to
4 Oscar Chess v. Williams, [19571 1 All E.R. 325. A second hand Morris,
represented at sale as a 1948 model, in fact was a 1939 model. The court
distinguished a warranty and a representation, claiming this particular
situation involved the latter, but refusing the ordinary remedy of rescission
for innocent misrepresentation because of the six-month time lapse between
sale and discovery of the defect.
5 Woods v. BorsteZ (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 68 (Alta. C.A.). Here the
discrepancy in representing a Ford Thunderbird car as a 1959 model rather
than a 1958 was held to be no more than a breach of warranty. Damages
were awarded.
6 O'Flaherty v. McKinlay [19531 2 D.L.R. 514 (Nfld. S.C.). A 1949 Hill-
man was represented as a 1950 model. "The representation was one going to
the root of the contract and it was a condition of the contract that the car
was a 1950 Hillman."
7 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 421.
8 Supra, footnote 5.
9 P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, (2nd ed.), p. 24.
10 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 671.
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avoid the problems arising from an exception clause," and, as will
be seen, has since been further developed.'2
Three difficulties arise in connection with this idea of the funda-
mental term. First, how does one define the fundamental obligation
of a contract? This problem has never been very adequately dis-
cussed in a Canadian court, and one might well question whether the
idea has ever been adopted in this country. Some assistance in this
direction has been provided by English courts,13 as well as academic
comment.14 However, on this basis alone, one might have expected
a somewhat more extensive discussion of the concept by the Manitoba
Court of Appeal.
Secondly, if one assumes the existence of the fundamental term,
what relief can be sought for its breach and what are the limits of
these remedies? According to Miller C.J.M., notwithstanding the
execution of the agreement, the plaintiff is entitled to repudiate the
contract. No mention is made of the acceptance of the goods or the
effect of a lapse of time before repudiation, although these two
elements were considered decisive in Yeoman Credit Ltd. v. Apps'5
where rescission for breach of the fundamental term of the contract
was forbidden on the grounds of acceptance. In the present case the
vehicle was kept for three or four months longer than the Yeoman
Credit case.
In contrast are three Canadian decisions-O'Flaherty v. McKin-
lay,16 White v. Munn Motors Ltd.,17 and McKenzie v. Royal Bank of
Canada.18 Each allows rescission for breach of an executed contract,
although only in the first two cases does the court refer to the funda-
mental obligation. In the last case the language of the court is less
clear, and the authority of the decision for our purposes has been
questioned.19 Both the former cases deal with innocent misrepresenta-
tions in the sale of motor vehicles. The first is a case in which a 1949
Hillman was represented as a 1950 model. The Munn case involved
a truck "sold as a three-quarter ton, but which in fact did not meet
those specifications. It would be a very thin line, by any interpretation
11 Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 2 All E.R. 866, at p. 869.
Denning' L.J. actually refers to a breach of a fundamental contractual obliga-
tion. However, the language used to elaborate the concept can be found in
earlier decisions such as Kennedy v. Panama, New Zealand, 4 Australian
Royal Mail (1867), L.R. 2 Q.B. 580, at p. 587, and Seddon v. North Eastern
Salt, [1905] 1 Ch. 326.
12 Yeoman Credit Ltd. v. Apps, [1961] 2 All E.R. 281, at pp. 289, 290 (C.A.).
13 Ibid.
14 G. H. L. Fridman, Complications of the Fundamental Term, (1961),
24 Mod. L. Rev. 648. The author, through a process of elimination, arrives
at what the courts would seem to consider the 'fundamental obligation'
although'he suggests "the courts are introducing such subtle gradations
between 'ordinary' and 'fundamental' conditions that no intelligible distinc-
tion will soon remain".
15 Supra, footnote 12.
16 [1953] 2 D.L.R. 514.
17 (1960), 45 M.P.R. 253 (Nfld. S.C.).
18 [1934] A.C. 468 (P.C.).
19 D. G. Farquharson (1935), 13 Can. Bar Rev. 244.
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of the facts, that would separate these two cases from Yeoman Credit
Ltd. v. Apps,20 and yet the relief allowed is entirely different.
In effect, the ability to determine whether a contract for the
sale of goods has proceeded too far to allow rescission must always be
based on a rather arbitrary decision. If a court is going to grant the
remedy, it should at least consider the entire scope of the law, notjust those decisions that support the judgment.
Thirdly, reference must be made in this consideration of the
fundamental obligation to the court's failure to mention the Sale of
Goods Act.21 The courts have generally been sympathetic to the
change in the bargaining position of the various parties in contract
negotiation. For example, in the present case, the year model of the
truck might easily have been treated as a condition2 2 and caught by
s. 13(3) of the Act. However, it was interpreted as a basic term of
the contract, breach of which is said to allow repudiation. This, in
effect, excludes the operation of an important section of the Sale of
Goods Act from a field of the law in which one would think it would
be of prime importance.
On the other hand, if one is to understand the court's interpreta-
tion as a misrepresentation of the year model,23 then the decision
has allowed rescission for misrepresentation after there has been
acceptance and a considerable lapse of time. In effect, the court is
providing better relief in this event than would have been available
had the court considered it a breach of condition.
Initially, it was suggested that in arriving at its decision the Mani-
toba Court of Appeal should have given more time and consideration
to the areas of the law which must inevitably be affected by its de-
cision, and the preceeding comments have tried to indicate the impact
which F. &, B. Transport v. White Truck Sales24 will have on these
established principles of law. However, with due respect, it is also
suggested that perhaps there are one or two alternative avenues
which, although they might require certain alterations in the law,
could achieve the same end in a more satisfactory manner.
First we must determine what it is that the courts are trying
to accomplish. Attention must be given to the policy that has attached
to these kinds of transactions. The bargaining strength of the vendor
has declined rapidly with the appearance of larger retail outlets. The
give and take that once characterized the commercial market has
been replaced by the standard form contract, and often the only
choice open to a purchaser is to take what is offered or go elsewhere.
Even then, he is often faced with the same offers from several
different sellers, all of whom have tailored their contracts to suit
their needs.
20 Supra, footnote 12.
21 R.S.M. 1954, c. 233.
22 See footnote 6.
23 See footnote 4.
24 Supra, footnote 1.
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Perhaps the answer might be to forbid a vendor to contract out
of the liability imposed by s. 15 and 16 of the Sale of Goods Act.
When the doctrine of the fundamental term is closely scrutinized,
it takes into account no more than those circumstances which a court
would consider in determining whether particular goods corresponded
with their description or were reasonably fit for the particular
purpose for which they were intended.25
On the other hand, rather than do away with the fundamental
obligation, it has been suggested that the idea of the fundamental
term be incorporated into the statute. To the extent that it would
bring the dispute back within the bounds of the Act it would be an
improvement, but is this in fact what we are trying to do? We
would only be deceiving ourselves in thinking a solution had been
found, because again we would be involved in the same arguments
and terminology.
With regard to the limits that should be afforded the remedy of
rescission the recommendations of the Tenth Report of the Law
Reform Committee (FN) are worthy of attention. The Committee
suggests that rescission be permitted after execution, although
affirmation of the contract or delay in seeking the remedy should
continue to bar this right. But, more important, it leaves the final
decision as to the allocation of damages or the granting of rescission
to the discretion of the court. At a time when flexibility is often the
tool best suited to achieving equitable results, this would seem to be
a very challenging innovation, at least as an experiment, if nothing
else.
In conclusion, it would appear that the opportunity for discussion,
if not reform, has been bypassed. The solution to the difficulty is by
no means clear, but not until it has been squarely faced by the courts
will the plight of the dissatisfied buyer be resolved with any degree
of certainty or authority.
COLIN C. COOLICAN*'
25 U.C.C. 1957, § 2-302 provides relief against a contract or clause which
the court finds unconscionable. However, its purpose is more the prevention
of oppression and unfair surprise than a new allocation of risk based on
superior bargaining powers. § 2-316 protects a buyer from unexpected and
unfamiliar language of disclaimer and allows the exclusion of implied war-
ranties only by conspicuous language.
* Mr. Coolican is a Second Year student at the Osgoode Hall Law School.
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